Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of CEO compensation. There are many factors that influence CEO compensation. For this research three factors has been selected: companies size, accounting factor and market factor. The study looks at the relationship between each of this factors and directors remuneration. Sample of companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) has been investigated over the period of 2007 -2010. Data has been collected through annual reports content analysis and announcement on websites of LSE and WSE. Linear regression has been run on collected data. Positive correlation has been found between directors' remuneration and companies' size in both British and Polish listed companies. The relationship is also positive between directors pay and companies performance. Companies' performance has been assets by return on equity ratio (ROE) and Tobin's Q. All the findings are consistent with the outcome presented within previous research by variety of scholars.
Introduction
Corporate governance was first introduced by A. Smith. He highlighted the changes in companies' behaviour as a consequence of separation of ownership and control. There is an ongoing debate at present how corporate governance should be define (Jarzemowska [13] , pp. [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . The concept of corporate governance can be looked at form legal and economic perspective. Economic approach describe corporate governance as "an institutional mechanism for regulating the relationship between the participants of corporate contracts, especially between managers and shareholders (...). It is a set of principles affecting the supervision and accountability of the company." (Ignyś-Lipowiecka [12] , pp. 215-216).
Corporate governance is strictly related with:
• accountability -the way in which managers are accounttable to shareholders,
• communication -how the company obtain and communicate information,
• relationships -diversified in terms of economic conditions and national traditions, between the owners and managers of corporations.
The main aim of corporate governance is to protect shareholders interest against misused of their capital by managers of a company. The rationale for the use of these practices may be the fact that the principles of corporate governance are an important factor when assessing a company. It could affect the valuation of the company or influence the investment decision of potential investor.
The models of corporate governance are the formal systems of accountability of top management to shareholders and they that should create an integrated value for the shareholder. These models are based on two assumptions:
• maximization of shareholder value is the best way to ensure their prosperity,
• financial goals can be achieved by building long term relationships with all stakeholders.
This allows to regard relationships with employees, customers, investors, suppliers and the community as an essential source for improving companies competitiveness. Good relationship is understood as value of information, reputation, contracts. The model of stakeholders groups (a network of formal and informal relationships of corporations -a pluralistic approach) is based on the assumption that the company is a social institution and therefore can extend its influence on the prosperity of society and brings benefits not only to shareholders but also to wide groups of other parties, as many companies may spend part of their profits on social objectives. This shows the direct connections "between social obligations, social responsibility and corporate social response." (Kopycińska [17] , p. 197).
The UK represent single tire corporate governance model. The major role is played by The Board of Director (executive and non-executive), who are elected at General Annual Meeting (AGM). The role of Board of Director is to manage the company on behalf of and in the best interest of shareholders (GajewskaJedwabny [7] , p. 492). On the other hand Polish capital marked is at quite early stage of developing corporate governance practice. The corporate governance principled main aim is to prevent some negative phenomena, such as fraud or violations of rights of minority shareholders (Gajewska-Jedwabny [7] , p. 502).
Solarz ([26] , p. 274) stress that as Anglo -Saxon model has a strong relationship between the remuneration of director and company performance, for Polish companies the remuneration of directors grow faster than profit, return on assets (ROA) and return on capital employed (ROE).
The recent academic debate within corporate governance concentrates on the relationship between CEO remuneration 1 and companies' performance. Investors are becoming more and more concern by companies' mismanagement after a series of corporate scandal such as Enron, World Com, Parmalat, Maxwell, Polly Peck etc. "Investors are shocked and apprehensive after recent news about huge payment of £1,7 billion in bonuses to the managers of RBS (Royal Bank of Scotland) despite bank making a £3,6 billion loss during 2009" (Seel [24] ). This example shows the inconsistency of classical compensation theory, as only improved performance should be awarded by higher remuneration. Investors start questioning high paid management contracts as being unreasonable more often than ever.
The problem with discrepancies between managers' compensation and investors' expectation is strongly address by agency theory and has been investigated by many researchers in the last three decades (Jensen et al. [14] , pp. 255-268; Kato et al. [16] , pp.1-19; Oetomo et al. [20] ). According to agency theory principal -agent relationships is a contract under which one or more persons (the principal engage another personthe agent) are engaged to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. For this services and contribution to shareholders wealth the agents are expecting to be properly rewarded, but the agents for obvious reasons do not always act in a way which contributes to maximising shareholders' (owners', principals') wealth.
Hence, the owners are forced to create and implement different incentive schemes and monitoring schemes for agents to minimize deviations. As it has been proved by many research managers (agents) work more efficiently only if they receive strong motivation such as perks, bonuses, fringe benefits, stock options, etc. If the agent should act in the best interest of the shareholder the efficiency (Ea desirable effect) is based on the appropriate relationship between following factors: the agent action in the interests of principal (b), the intensity of work the agent (i) and agent remuneration or criteria on which remuneration is based (w). (Gruszecki [9] , pp. 220). This is expressed by the formula:
Regardless the large number of conducted researches concerning agency costs there are still some reservations about the role the different incentives play in managers performance and what is the best structure of mangers (directors) remunerations. Although many empirical studies claim that incentive schemes can notably increase productivity of mangers and an optimal compensation contract is a cure for the principalagent conflict, some research or even recent examples, give grounds for considering high pay-performance contracts as not reasonable 2 .
Therefore, it becomes increasingly interesting to test the relationship between directors' remuneration and company performance. The first part of the paper describes the different incentive incorporated in directors' remuneration package. The second part analyse current state of research with directors payperformance. Third part discusses the methodology used in the study and results obtained. The last part presents conclusions and recommendations.
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The research has been conducted on companies listed on London Stock Exchange and Warsaw Stock Exchange. The period taken into analysis covers the years 2007-2010.
Directors remuneration
Companies' directors can be rewarded in many ways. They receive basic salary, which includes pension contributions and prerequisites such as companies' car, club membership, etc. In addition, top executives usually obtain bonuses that are usually linked to the directors' performance. They can also be entitled to longterm incentives plans usually in the form of stock options. The most commune incentive programs are:
• stock option plan,
• restricted stock plan,
• performance plan,
• deferred compensation plan,
• performance based cash compensation plan,
• profit related plan,
• company Share Option Plan.
The basic executive salary is usually determined through benchmarking method. This is conducted by remuneration committee and is based on directors' qualification, experience, past success and firm size. In the recent years, it can observe continuous increase of directors' salaries as they usually argue for competitive rewards and expect the increase on yearly basis. The new trend has been detected of new CEO (Chief Executive Directors or Managing Directors) requesting higher remuneration package than currently serving CEO.
At the end of financial year director are usually rewarded with cash bonuses. The size of the bonus is based on the company performance over the previous 12 months and is typically is related to profit measurement such as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) or earning per share (EPS). The other commonly use measure is economic value added (EVA). In addition to the mention measures CEO contract usually have a minimum threshold that needs to be reached in order to qualify for the bonus. The bonus can be paid as a lump sum or as a percentage in relation to chosen measure. Many professional bodies are in favour of bonuses versus pay rise as bonuses are awards for realised current achievements and pay raises are increase for the future unrealised performance 3 .
The most popular market -orientated incentive pay is executive stock option. It allows directors to purchase the shares at a fixed price, called price or strike price. This means that if the share price reaches the higher level than strike price, the directors will gain additional profit. This approach encourages CEO and other directors to efficiently manage the company as the better company performs the higher share price can be achieved. Most of the researchers consider this method as aligning the mangers and shareholders goals 4 .
Some researchers stress that executive option contributed to governance failure in 1990s and early 2000s (e.g. Enron). That's why two new incentives have been recently introduced; restricted stock grants and performance share. Restricted stock include common stocks on which limitation has been imposes. The limitations are related to the time for which the share cannot be sold or to the certain goals that is need to be achieved before the shares can be sold. The advantage of this tactics versus option is that its value is not impacted by asymmetric 5 . Performance share approach describes the situation in which the executives are award the shares only if certain criteria are achieved such as for example EPS. In this sense, the shears are regarded as rewards for past -realised achievement 6 .
Directors payment and companies performance
The academic interest in executive pay began in the early 80's. Most of the researchers tried to find out relation between executive pay and firm performance. Some tried to figure out what factors influence executive compensation, how much the firm should pay or when firm should pay more to motivate executives etc. The majority research on executive compensation has been guided by agency theory. As managers are the main decision makers, it is therefore essential to motivate managers or directors through contract Edmans et al. [5] proposed a multiplicative model, which incorporates the integrated theory of sensitivity and level of executives' pay in market equilibrium. The innovation in comparison to the current approach is "Firstly, motivated by first principles, consumer theory, and macroeconomic models and multiplicative preferences in the principal -agent problem" and secondly "endogenize total pay in a market equilibrium by embedding the principal-agent problem into a competitive assignment model of CEO talent" (Edmans et al. [5] , p. 2). 
Research methodology
This research concentrates on investigating whether CEO remuneration is positively related to companies' size, accounting performance and to market performance. The investigation try to addresser the following questions:
• Does relation between firm size and directors' remuneration exist in selected sample -this part of the research follows the approach of Oetomo et al. [20] , who examined directors' remuneration in relation to companies' size. They used book value of total assets as a proxy for firm size. Rosser et al. ([23] , pp. 115-126) also used book value of total assets as firm size when they investigated the impact of firm size on CEO compensation. Following regression model is used to determine the relationship between CEO compensation on firm size:
CEO remuneration = a + b { firm size ( total assets ) } + e (2)
• Does company performance impact directors remuneration -to answer this question Shim et al. ([25] , pp. 93-116) path will be followed. They used return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for accounting performance indicator and Tobin's Q as a performance measurement for market factor to determine the impact of company performance on directors pay. To determine the relationship between CEO compensation on accounting factor: following regression model is used:
CEO compensation = a + b {accounting factor ( ROE )} + e
-ROE is calculated by dividing Net income after tax with total equity, -net income is selected after tax and preferred stock dividends but before common stock dividends,
-preferred shares are excluded from total equity.
To determine the relationship between CEO compensation on market factor following regression model is used:
CEO compensation = a + b{ market factor (Tobin's Q)} +e
Here market value equals to:
where:
MVE -is the market value of shareholders equity, DEBT -is the value of the firm's short -term liabilities net its short term assets plus the book value of the firms long term debt, PS -is the liquidating value of the firm's outstanding preferred stock, TA -is the book value of the total assets of the firm. In all three models compensation (remuneration) is consider as dependant variable. Compensation is the total of cash pay and share own by CEO (director).
Data collection and findings
At first 130 from companies has been considered for this study, but the final sample contains only 110 listed companies as some of the companies have not disclosed necessary information over investigated period. 80 companies have been randomly chosen from Within investigated UK listed companies, the minimum full compensation was £900,000 as the highest £8,9m. At the same, the same time the average basic salary of CEO reached £981,000. Within Polish listed companies the minimum full compensation was PLN 2,8m as the highest PLN 9,88m. At the same time the average basic salary of CEO reached PLN 865,000. The data has been obtained through content analysis of annual reports of selected companies. Table 1 , Table 2 , Table 3 and Table 4 present correlation matrix between director's compensation, firm size (total assets), accounting factor (ROE) and market factor (Tobin's Q).
The research shows (see Table 1 It is rather surprising that in the second period the correlation is so strong over the economy downturn (2009) (2010) . T-test value of the regression coefficient of the constant is 2,213 in the first period and 3,333 in the second period. This is significant and the t-test value of the regression coefficient of the independent variable, which is firm size (total assets), in this case, is 0,212 and 0,343 respectively. Table 5 ) a positive relation with accounting factor (0,027) and market factor (0,028) can be seen but negative relation with firm size (-0 The regression of CEO compensation on firm size (see Table 7 and Table 8 T-test value of the regression coefficient of the constant is 2,111 in the first period and 2,233 in the second period. This is significant and the t-test value of the regression coefficient of the independent variable, which is firm size (total assets), in this case, is 0,213 and 0,233 respectively.
The results obtain within Polish companies are very similar to those noted when investigating British firms and are in line with outcomes of studies of Jansen et al. ([14] [1] , pp. 593-616) stress that usually there is greater pay performance sensitivity in larger firms and lesser significance of pay performance sensitivity in smaller firms. This allows to conclude there is that directors' compensation is positively related with firm size. Although it should be noted that further studies should be conducted to look for more factors underpinning this trend. There is positive a correlation between directors pay and accounting factor within British companies (Table  9 and Table 10 The results of Polish firms show similar results (see Table 11 and When looking at the links between directors' compensation and market factor it can be noted that a positive correlation exists between Tobin's Q and directors' remuneration within UK companies (Table 13 and  Table 14 ). T-test value of the regression coefficient of the constant is 0,511 and 0,577 respectively, which is significant. The t-test value of the regression coefficient of the independent variable, which is market factor (Tobin's Q), in this case, is 0,488 and 0,511(see Table 15 and Table 16 ). 
Conclusions
Looking at the area of directors' compensation the question is always raised how remuneration is related to directors' impute. How remuneration package needs to be structure to maximise shareholders wealth. In most cases CEO payment are correlated with companies' performance and size. This research established positive correlation between directors' payment and companies' size (book asset value) in both British and Polish listed companies. Furthermore, positive correlation has been found between firms return on capital and directors remuneration in both samples. Directors' compensation is also positively associated with market performance for both British and Polish firm. All three factors are much stronger correlated with directors remuneration within British companies. This can be associated with more developed economy, different structure of directors' remuneration, or British directors having stronger position when negotiating payment packages. All findings are consistent with the results obtained by scholars conducting research in this field.
British companies are obliged to disclose information about director's remuneration. It is strongly regarded as an element of enhancing the transparency of corporate governance. It was disappointing that many Polish listed companies do not publish information about directors' remuneration. This force researcher to limit the study to thirty companies only. It is hoped that in the future Polish companies disclose more information about directors' remuneration and it would be possible to conduct wider analysis in this field.
